This file is copyright of Jens Schriver (c) It originates from the Evil House of Cheat More essays can always be found at: --- http://www.CheatHouse.com --- ... and contact can always be made to: Webmaster@cheathouse.com -------------------------------------------------------------- Essay Name : 1377.txt Uploader : T Smith Email Address : Language : English Subject : Politics Title : Japan in the New World Order Grade : B School System : universtiy Country : Canada Author Comments : book review on two books, 15 pages, single spaced Teacher Comments : Date : apr 95 Site found at : -------------------------------------------------------------- I- Introduction The past five years have seen the world change dramatically. The demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the disputed relative decline of the earth's remaining superpower, the United States, has imposed great changes on the world's political framework. These alterations and the focus on economic power rather than political or military cause many to ask questions concerning the international status quo. Essentially the questions are thus: In the new order, who will be the nations in charge? And since Japan is the second largest economy, what role will it play? Some political scientists and observers of the international world hold that Japan will rise to take the place as the if not one of the superpowers, as the United States is gradually and irreversibly losing its grip on world supremacy and for them the only possible replacement is Japan. There are others who hold that Japan will continue to display tendencies of minimal intervention and a cautious and hesitant nature in the international arena. They maintain that Japan has no choice but to continue this behavior due to both international and domestic constraints, thus rendering it powerless in the international scope. Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change and Japan in the Posthegemonic World attempt to clarify these issues from a both a Japanese and international perspective by studying Japan's foreign relations and domestic policies. These books examine the various characteristics of Japan's foreign policy in an attempt to decipher the role that Japan will play in the future. Of particular interest are the similarities and differences between what the Japanese themselves see as their role and what the international community and its various entities believe should be the future roles of Japan. II- Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change A- Ideas and Structures- The author, Takashi Inoguchi, asserts that two basic premises underpin the perceptions of Japan by foreign entities. The first is the view of Japan as adrift, using an ad hoc pragmatism to deal with both its domestic and international concerns. The other is the view of Japan as tenaciously steadfast to national interests and disregarding any foreign pressures. Further supplementing these claims is the perception of Japan as a free-rider. For example, Japan spends approximately 1.5 percent of GDP on defense compared with 6 percent for the United States. This causes some consternation as some believe that a rich Japan has long benefited from U.S. security and economic benevolence without giving much in return to their providers or the international community. Of particular mention is the Gulf War scenario in which the U.S., Germany and other countries contributed the lion's share of economic and military support. This is especially unsettling when one considers the fact that 65 percent of Japan's oil consumption is dependent on the Middle East compared with 3 percent for the U.S.. In addition, Japan was considered stingy and selective in distributing foreign aid as they gave only to those countries or industries that directly benefits Japan. Japan as a challenger to the established world order has also been lent credence due to its success on the economic front. Japan has replaced the U.S. as the largest creditor and can also claim the largest percentage of foreign owned assets relative to GDP as a result of massive FDI. An issue related to the first perception of Japan as free-rider is the spending on defense related industries. As it is minimal compared to other major powers, some contend that Japan need only increase this spending a few percentage points relative to GDP and not only would the world have an economic superpower but a military one as well. Yet another view of Japan can be supported by further evidence. Japan as a supporter of the "free world", in particular the U.S. is substantiated by the fact that by the early 90s Japan had become the second largest foreign aid donor and had become less discriminatory in the disbursements, not only by de-emphasizing infrastructure as the primary end of aid, but also increased geographical coverage to such hitherto untouched countries as Kenya, Nepal and Somalia. Japan has also taken a more responsible approach to its role in the international community by becoming the second largest contributor to the World Bank, sharing most of the military cost of U.S. forces in Japan, and following the Plaza Accord, prodding the EEC to help devalue the dollar. Japan could neither be a supporter, challenger or free-rider if it wasn't for the spectacular growth it experienced in the roughly thirty years following World War II. This development was not a phenomenon confined to Japan, or dependent on Japanese know-how or capability. During the 50s and 60s the vital aspects for economic growth were present the world over. Money supply expanded at an astonishing rate, technological innovations abounded and coupled with low commodity prices and few resource constraints, Japan could grow unhindered. In addition, as a relative latecomer in modernization, Japan could benefit from technology transfer and the resulting shortened learning curve. Under the U.S. hegemonic umbrella, Japan could benefit in a number of ways. Firstly, it could dispense with military expenditures and focus on economic growth. Liberal access to world markets and a favorable yen-dollar exchange rate added to business success. In addition, a stable domestic political framework allowed Japan to focus on consistent economic policy. This environment could not last forever and change was inevitable. As deregulation of the financial markets spread to more countries and markets, a global economic metamorphoses ensued. For example, a freely floating exchange rate meant that central banks and economies had to accustom themselves to the new order. And for a time there was instability in the financial markets which led to trade imbalances and eventually an overvalued dollar. This exacerbated the situation and led to further trade deficits and the accompanying calls of protectionism for those adversely affected and liberalization who profited from the changes. These events had a profound influence on Japan's assumptions of its economy. The first was that a small economy does not influence others and second that an economy can be isolated and regulate external forces at its borders. But as Japan's economy grew and acquired more financial clout and exhibited its strength through practices such as large FDI, it was no longer seen as a small economy and could not benefit from the preferential trade practices accorded to small, developing economies. In addition, following the two oil shocks, capital flows became more volatile and calls for a strong Japan to liberalize its markets grew louder. The result is that Japan had little choice but to reform its trade policies. In short, Japan changed from a small, closed economy into a large, open one. Within this changing world, the issue of security took on an increasingly important role within the domestic perspective. The Superpower race meant that the U.S. put strong pressure on its allies to solidify the relationship, one way was to isolate the Soviet Union by refraining from pursuing any business contracts with the Soviet Bloc. The government did not need any persuasion to be wary of the Soviet Union as Japan already had a long-standing dispute regarding the Northern Territories. Though in a way this only added to the dilemma, as the emphasis on domestic security caused some concern among the pacifist electorate which arose from the consequences of the militarism of the 30s and 40s. The government attempted to accommodate these pressures with the ones coming from the U.S. to share the economic and military burden while not arousing increased public pacifism. The internal logic backing the issues facing Japan comes from several directions. One of which stems from the fact that Japan was barred from possessing significant forces following their defeat in WW II and the subsequent agreement with the U.S.. This allowed Japan to look inward and permitted them to stand aloof from outside pressures and pursue policies of economic superiority rather than military or social. For example during the 50s and 60s economic growth was attained at the expense of social well-being and during the 70s and 80s when the government stressed anti-inflation policies over public infrastructure projects. Some of these policies did change during the economic crises that were experienced the whole world over during the 70s. The oil shocks had particularly severe consequences for Japan as it is especially dependent on importing energy to fuel its growth. Recession followed the lack of a cheap, abundant supply of energy and the result was that the administration adopted policies of internal equilibrium at the cost of external, international disequilibrium. Again the focus inward found a method in pursuing stategies of tight monetary policy and loose fiscal policy which was against the world trend of Keynesian and monetarist economics. Politics were also effected by the crises of the 70s as the electorate became frustrated by the seeming inability of the politicians to correct the economic situation. Political instability followed with the ruling LDP party losing influence and then trying to find appropriate measures to gain back their lost popularity by increasing social spending. So rather then appeasing fears and facilitating growth and stability, the conflicting policies implemented during the tumultuous years tended to exacerbate an already trying situation. Further making a difficult situation even more tenuous was the attempt by the administration to meet external requirements. During the early 80s, "comprehensive national security" was part of a Japanese image reform program aimed at bolstering political, economic and military strength. To accomplish this, the government slashed expenditure on social welfare programs, put a ceiling on the budget and diverted education spending into defense, foreign aid and technology sectors. Consequently, the government was faced with decisions critical to the future role of Japan on the world political stage. The first option was to stay close to the U.S. and continue to depend on Americans for security and access to world markets. The second was to develop its own bloc and take on the responsibility that that position entailed. Regardless of the chosen strategy, what was most important was that Japan needed to develop a policy supported by internal logic. Both the search for tactics and a consistent, collaborative logic continues to play at the forefront of the leader's minds as they decide their proper role in world politics. B- Japan's Uncertainty and Unease with itself: International Structure and International Role- The perception of Japan as a supporter, freeloader or spoiler has its roots in Japan's role in several different areas. On the subject of trade, it is most often viewed as a party that actively seeks to upset trade balances between countries. The motivation behind trade imbalances can be questioned, but not the trade patterns themselves. Japan consistently imports commodities and exports manufactured goods, and as this is the case, it seeks to protect those industries that are weakest and promote those that are strongest. Some say the result is an overly protectionist, closed market policy that causes upsets not only in trade but also in the world financial markets. The subject of money also causes concern among interested parties. Following the Plaza Accord, the yen rose in prominence while the U.S. dollar went about its prescribed course of devaluation. Further fueling the rising eminence of the yen was the effect of the large U.S. deficit held in foreign currencies. As the dollar continued to decline, more and more traders swapped dollars for yen. Japan was seen to have exploited the weak dollar by building up reserves of the cheap currency and waiting for the day that the dollar returned to a higher level. To accompany this advantage in reserves, Japan was accused of unfair trade and FDI practices. These actions, complained some, were hardly befitting of a responsible economic power. Technology was also an issue as once again Japan was accused of being very protectionist in its policies towards technology sharing or development. This situation has eased somewhat in the past few years as some firms have made concessions and have collaborated on projects with U.S. firms. The most probable reason for this change is that Japanese firms recognized that in order to move ahead they had to cooperate at least at a minimal level with the world's most technologically advanced country and its home firms. Security is always a topic of heated debate in both Japanese internal and external politics, and this is especially so when Japan is seen by some to be a semi-sovereign country with its real military decisions made in Washington rather than Tokyo. Regardless of where the policy is devised and decided, there were and still are some rather pressing concerns facing decision makers. The first is the ongoing confrontation with Russia regarding the Northern Territories. After the fall of the Soviet Union, some thought that concessions could be forced from Russia in view of its confused and vulnerable state. This did not come to pass, and though the two nations have normalized relations, there still remains some angst and distrust among both parties, though a military conflict is most probably not a plausible scenario. Expansionist and aggressive actions by the Chinese in the South China Sea, and Chinese support of North Korea also worries Japan. Questions remain unanswered as to China's eventual goal and purpose and this understandably causes Japan some consternation. With these two issues looming at the forefront of Japan's foreign security policy, and limited legal scope for solitary military action, it still has to cur favor with the U.S. to keep the U.S. security umbrella in the region to even out the military balance. In addition to the above, but deeper and more far-reaching is an issue that is so ingrained that in many ways it is the primary driver in Japanese policy. That point is one that concerns the memory of WW II by both the Japnese and the victims of aggression. All parties involved feel that Japan has a debt-of history that needs to be resolved with the affected nations before any real trust is exchanged between concerned parties. Until that time, it is likely that Japan will stay in the back seat with the U.S. as the driver due to this debt-of history issue. It is a daunting task to define and implement a role in a world community when a people have for most of their history closed their borders and chosen to look inward for development and success of their society. This becomes even more difficult when the same country experiences a dramatic upward swing in influence among their neighbors and the world in effect becoming a smaller place. The questions of how to or whether to separate national interests from global ones or to be protectionist or liberal loom before every policy maker. What Japan decides to do and how it decides to do it remain to be seen, and are perhaps some of the most important questions that must be answered in the world today. C- Japan's foreign policy in a time of global uncertainty- At times a seeming immovable and uncompromising bureaucracy and at other times a responsive, adaptable network. These are the descriptions that Japan has earned over the years due to its involvement in foreign affairs and opening its import doors. For example in 1979, Japan was asked to contribute to a foreign aid package for Afghanistan, in which the response to these cries for help were excruciatingly slow, but by 1989, Japan had become the #1 aid donor in South Asia. Also criticized in the early 80s for allowing little domestic demand due to its growth strategy of using exports to fuel expansion, but by 1989, four years later, Japan had doubled its imports and now has a lower trade to GDP ratio than the United States. Poignant examples of Japan's hesitancy can be seen in its response to the Gulf War and Gorbachev. The crux of the problem, as always, is that Japan has difficulty in adjusting to the complex post Cold War world as it must attempt to shoulder international responsibilities that are compatible with the views of the Japanese public. Japan was largely in a state of denial concerning the new Russia until Gorbachev's visit in April 1991, when the current administration reappraised its policies concerning the Sakhalin islands and U.S. desires that Japan and Russia forge closer relations. The government refused to give in entirely on the issue but has made some headway largely due to U.S. brokering of discussions. The Gulf War was a testing ground for Japan's commitment to acting as a responsible world citizen, and some say that Japan failed this test. When asked to commit funds and forces to the conflict, the administration asserted that a commitment of forces was out of the question as the treaty signed with the United States in the 50s prohibited armed forces from being involved in foreign conflicts. As to the desired funds, the government finally capitulated after several months of stalling and finally agreed to show their support by committing $6 billion, not without much arm-twisting by the U.S. and German governments. Japan's handling of the Gorbachev and Gulf situations can provide a guide as to how Japan will pursue further foreign policies. If the pattern holds true, it will not stray far from the U.S. as it both wants and needs the strength and bargaining position that the U.S holds and realistically, there are not any plausible alternatives. This is not to say it will remain totally dependent on American support and intervention, as some critics assert that Japan has far too many eggs in one basket and should attempt to establish relationships with the rest of the world on its own accord and by its own measures. Uncertainty is also caused by domestic political conflicts. There has been a change in the style of politics in the past decade. In particular, the government is now influenced more by the private sector than the public sector as it was in the 80s. This is evident in the concessions that many firms are making to the U.S. and other trading partners as they recognize that freer trade is in their best interest. Government decisions largely reflect these private sector sentiments. Japanese politics has become more "political", that is to say less bureaucratic, and involving more dissent and discussion. Though not encouraged, nonconformity is at least tolerated. As Japanese politics is based more on consensus than conflict, in recent years this has fomented a lack of decisive leadership and the resulting rudderless diplomacy both within and without political parties. An example of the consequences of the inaction or inability to act was the near paralysis, and near death of of the EAEG (East Asia Economic Grouping) in the early 90s, which is obviously in Japan's best interests in which to play an active role. D- Japan's Role in International Affairs- Ultimately the pressure to take on a more active role outweighs countervailing forces. What counts in favor for this position is the deep seated conviction that Japan and its people are an honorable sort who hold aspirations to make positive and influential contributions to the community in which they live. Japan's financial clout cannot be overlooked in this assessment as there are very few countries that are willing, let alone able to assume a world leadership position and the financial responsibilities that come with such influence. Japan is one of these countries, but before it rises to such a position there are certainly factors that need to be resolved. The first of which are the domestic impediments which come from pacifist tendencies of the electorate, a focus on domestic economics and the practice of consensual policy making. This has resulted and will continue to result in zigzagging and indecisive decision making. Related making decisions by consensus are the ministerial disagreements on economic matters in which matters are referred to all the ministries that have even a modicum of interest in the issues concerned. The result is that powerful ministries such as MITI and Foreign Affairs oftimes do not have identical agendas but are still expected to come to a consensus. The result is much infighting and bureaucratic inefficiencies that only delays decisions on matters which require immediate attention. International impediments to a more active role are the aforementioned debts-of - history and a seldom mentioned notion that as much as the U.S. would like Japan to share some responsibility, it still wishes to remain the world leader. So it can be expected that not too much slack will be cut for an East Asian financial powerhouse no matter how good relations are or how well intentioned the neighbor is. Assuming everything goes as planned and Japan resolves both its internal and external conflicts, there still remains the issue of official and membership in world politics and institutions. Japan's involvement in organizations such as NATO and ASEAN must be ironed out before any further steps are taken. Ideally, Japan will swiftly graduate from observer status to full participation in NATO following U.S. sponsorship and persuasion of the other members abroad and increasing and liberalizing the SDF and persuading the stiff domestic opposition to think otherwise. The next logical step is membership in ASEAN, but before this can be obtained, the other members must feel fully secure with the notion of an armed internationally mobile force. Even if this issue is resolved, the potential rivalry with the United States will still matter so most probably both Japanese and American forces will pursue joint activities. The final step for Japan will be a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. Though before this occurs, all of the above matters must be put in their proper place as well as the world at large trusting and feeling comfortable with a new Japanese role on the world stage. III- Japan in the Posthegemonic world Edited and compiled by Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, Japan in the Posthegemonic World represents an international collaborative effort to examine both Japan's own view of its role in the posthegemonic world and other countries' expectations regarding Japan. The geographical focus of the collective scrutiny is on the Pacific Rim as it is the region of utmost importance to Japan and of growing significance to the rest of the world. The book operates under the premise that the days are gone when the world was divided by two superpowers, then one, and eventually, some argue no world leaders to guide the world into the next century. There is no consensus as to the degree of the U.S. decline or whether the decline is absolute or relative, reversible or irreversible. There are even some that claim the notion of U.S. hegemonic decline as either excessively alarmist or empirically false. Even among the "declinists", there is no agreement on the possible causes of the U.S. power slide. Some observers nominate misguided policy in Washington such as supply-side Reagonomics and excessive defense spending, while others decry the absence of an industrial policy including public-private sector cooperation with the United States. Other analysts find causes of the U.S. decline outside the country. For example, some have found faults with the trade practices of Japan and other export-oriented countries. Other historians and political scientists see the excessive commitment of national resources to global political and security commitments as the most important cause of U.S. decline. Finally, some see the decline as a virtually inevitable phase in the cyclical rise and fall of great powers in world history. Nor is there a common understanding of the possible consequences of U.S. hegemonic decline. Some remind us that the past periods of power transition were extremely unstable and even dangerous, with World Wars I and II coming during the period when British hegemonic power had been spent, but the United States, the emerging global economic power, was unwilling to assume world leadership. Others suppose that trade, financial, and other international regimes may facilitate policy coordination among the major economic powers of the world and promote collective problem solving. After all, they contend, their calculation of national interests will indicate the desirability of cooperation over discord. The diversity of views on the cause and consequences of U.S. hegenomic decline notwithstanding, there is an almost unanimous worldwide opinion that the management of global and regional problems in the post-Cold War era requires, at a minimum, effective and timely policy coordination and efficacious burden and power sharing among the United States, Japan and the European Community. The editors of the book believe that collective management such as the above is desirable, but that it would require hitherto unprecedented levels of cooperation among the three central powers. Particularly crucial to this arrangement is Japan's ability and willingness to clearly define its role in the emerging new world order and to translate that definition into effective policy. Equally important will be the expectations of others regarding Japan's role and behavior in the posthegemonic world and how any discrepancies between the Japanese and non-Japanese views can be eliminated, or at least reduced, through political dialogue and policy coordination. Hegemony is obviously the main theme of this book, but is treated by different authors in slightly different ways. But there is almost no disagreement that the U.S. was a hegemon after World War II and in the first half of the Cold War. Then, international conditions were quite different from what we are experiencing now in the 1990s in the unique economic and military superiority of the United States and in the economic and military threats to its much weaker major power allies. Questions are often asked about whether the United States can regain the hegemony it once enjoyed and whether Japan can become a hegemon, perhaps a new kind that can lead by its economic power without an enormous military capability. In this decade the answer to both question appears to be "no". The former weakened major powers no longer need the protection, either military or economic, for which they once depended upon the United States. The United States has let its economic capabilities be seriously drained by its prodigal behavior in the 80s when it bought so much on credit and consumed as if there was no tomorrow. It can no longer easily provide direct benefits to other countries or such generous free public goods, although it still provides a huge affluent market to major powers and developing countries alike, despite its increasing protectionism. It is limited in the use of military threats or force except against aggressive terrorist states. A- The Primacy of Economic Development over Military Rivalry- In the 1990s, Japan is much more independent and confident in using its economic power and influence both regionally and globally, but the pacifist inclination of its population and its major political institutions make it impossible to arm itself on a large-scale basis, and difficult to use its military power outside its own borders. The continuation of the Japanese pacifist inclination was strongly demonstrated in the tortuous attempt to allow Japanese military forces to participate in international peacekeeping under the United Nations in the Gulf War. It is also very unlikely that Japan can convert its economic influence into the sort of international hegemonic leadership shown by the U.S. in creating international public goods, such as the formation of global institutions like Bretton Woods, the IMF, the OECD and a host of other regimes and organizations. Nor has Japan exerted much significant positive leadership in international organizations outside of its own region. In something as basic to a hegemon as making its market truly open and welcoming to its trading and investment partners, only a few of Japan's leaders have begun to realize the necessity of that course to reduce the friction and criticism directed at it by the rest of the world, let alone induce the world to cooperate more. With the decline in the salience of military force, the economic dynamism of the Asia Pacific region takes on added importance and attractiveness to those outside of it. Japan's role as a model and source of investment, aid, and as a potential market only adds to its influence. The United States, despite its own capital needs, remains a major market and investment source for Asian states, which still depend on its market for their export- led development. Japan's imports --------------------------------------------------------------